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Abstract
In the field of international trade, standards and technical regulations, such as Non-
tariff measures (NTMs), are gaining more attention during the recent years. Unlike 
Non-tariff barriers (NTBs), NTMs ensure sound protection for domestic consumers, 
quality of imported goods, and safety to the environment. However, although NTMs 
have such sound purposes, past literature report that they often tend to be a disturbance 
to international trade. In this research, we have constructed an Additional Compliance 
Requirements Indicator (ACRI) using the newly reported UNCTAD TRAINS NTMs 
database, to analyze whether additional regulations genuinely hamper international 
trade and if so, through which channel – the extensive margin or intensive margin 
of international trade. The Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimation 
results show that additional regulations on Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS)-related 
measures hamper international trade via the intensive margin of international trade in 
the total sample and the extensive margin of international trade in the agriculture sector. 
On the other hand, additional regulations on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)-related 
measures foster the extensive margin of machinery sector but sabotage the extensive 
margin of agriculture sector. Apart from the sound purposes listed initially, technical 
regulations also contribute to product diversification of the machinery sector. Therefore, 
harmonization of regulations would be a better solution than the complete eradication 
of NTMs. 
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1.  Introduction and literature review
In the field of international trade, standards and technical regulations are gaining more 
attention during the recent years. Traditional literature on international trade emphasize 
that tariff reductions, Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs), and geographical distance, 
are the explicit obstacles that hamper international trade. Balassa (1966), Calvo-Pardo 
et al. (2009), and Eaton and Kortum (2002) focused their studies on the unfavorable 
effect of tariff rates on international trade. Several studies have analyzed the positive 
effects of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), such as the reduction of bilateral and 
multilateral tariff rates, on international trade and regionalization (Baier & Bergstrand, 
2007; Kawai & Wignaraja, 2010; Lakatos & Nilsson, 2017; Urata & Kiyota, 2003). 
Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003) and Chaney (2008) have stressed the unfavorable 
impact of geographical distance on trade, when applying the traditional gravity model. 
Nonetheless, rapid reductions of traditional trade costs were insufficient in explaining 
the recent slow growth of international trade. Some were concerned that Non-tariff 
measures (NTMs) may act as a hidden barrier for bilateral trade. 
This paper aims to find answers to two questions. One, does the imposition of more 
NTMs by importing countries genuinely hamper international trade? Two, if yes, then 
through which channel do NTMs exert more significant influence - the extensive margin 
or intensive margin of international trade? In other words, how does the imposition of 
regulations by importing countries change the behavior of exporters? Do the exporters 
resort to diversifying their products or do they start focusing more on incumbent 
goods? According to UNCTAD (2019), technical regulations comprise of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), and pre-shipment 
inspection. The imposition of SPS and TBT are often related to agricultural goods and 
manufacturing goods, respectively. Unlike Non-tariff barriers (NTBs), NTMs ensure 
sound protection for domestic consumers, quality of imported goods, and safety to the 
environment. NTBs are explicitly meant to restrict imports and include export subsidies, 
import bans, and even quotas on specific products. NTMs, on the other hand, include 
requiring the implementation of safety measures such as registration of specific food 
items for authorization with the Ministry of Health, labelling of potentially hazardous 
materials, or even requiring licensing for the importation of medicated feed mills, the 
original purpose of which was not intended to hamper international trade flow. In this 
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study, we will be referring to technical regulations as NTMs. Standards and technical 
regulations can often be confused with each other. The significant difference between 
the two terms is conformity; standards are voluntary measures, whereas technical 
regulations are official norms enforced by governments. As this paper focuses on 
documented regulations that are not intended to impede international trade, we will 
be using the terms technical regulations, regulations, and NTMs interchangeably, to 
denote technical regulations. 
We began this study by assuming that NTMs or technical regulations form part of 
fixed costs rather than variable costs. As these regulations need to be fulfilled before 
selling the goods in the foreign market, exporters need to follow the regulations 
unconditionally, before engaging in the sale. After complying with the NTMs, they 
can focus on other trade barriers. Michida et al. (2017) further developed Krugman 
(1980)’s Love of Variety model by treating NTMs as fixed costs. They assumed that 
the certification to validate regulatory measures are marginal for variable costs and, 
therefore, NTMs mostly affect the fixed costs of international trade. Based on this 
theory, we postulate that NTMs are part of fixed costs that exporters need to fulfill 
before penetrating the foreign market. Several studies utilize fixed costs to fill the gap 
between diminishing trade costs and the slow growth of international trade. Chaney 
(2008), Lawless and Whelan (2007), and Melitz (2003) emphasize the need for sellers 
to meet fixed costs before entering the export market. In meeting these fixed costs, less 
productive firms will fall behind, and only higher productive firms that can surpass 
their fixed costs will be able to participate in the foreign market. 
Past literature has often pointed out that, although NTMs have sound purposes, they 
disturb international trade. Ghodsi et al. (2017) utilized NTMs data from the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) Integrated Trade Intelligence Portal (I-TIP) database and 
showed that TBT overall impedes international trade. Likewise, Fontagné and Orefice 
(2018) used the Specific Trade Concerns (STCs) data from WTO to examine the impact 
of TBT measures on international trade. They showed that TBT causes a trade diversion 
effect and reduces export flows, especially for homogeneous sectors. Fugazza et al. 
(2017) utilized NTMs data of the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA) 
proposed by United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and 
the Multi-Agency Support Team (MAST) to show that below-median sized firms incur 
heavy expenditure in terms of export values due to regulations. Other studies also 
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show that NTMs cause compliance costs that directly affect firms’ competitiveness, 
eventually sabotaging their international trade flows (Grundke & Moser, 2019; 
Hoekman & Nicita, 2008). 
We have constructed the Additional Compliance Requirement Indicator (hereafter, 
ACRI) to capture the additional burden borne by exporting countries when entering 
foreign markets. Past literature often suffers due to lack of information regarding 
quantification of NTMs. They often construct the number of NTMs, coverage ratio, and 
frequency index to represent NTMs, which capture only the absolute number of technical 
regulations imposed by importers, but lack data regarding bilateral differences across 
nations. Furthermore, the NTMs data available in the STCs database contains only the 
regulations reported as NTBs by the imposing countries. Hence, the number of NTMs, 
coverage ratio, and frequency ratio from the database often lack technical and non-trade 
distorting regulations. Moreover, the WTO I-TIP database reports only those NTMs 
notified by importers, which may cause data inconsistency across different nations. To 
overcome these constraints, we constructed bilateral regulatory distance following the 
concept of Nabeshima and Obashi (2019), using UNCTAD-Trade Analysis Information 
System (TRAINS) NTMs data. The current research further adopts the newly updated 
panel NTMs data to examine the impact of NTMs on international trade flow. Previous 
researches such as those conducted by Cadot et al. (2015), Ing and Cadot (2017), and 
Kee et al. (2009) already utilized the cross-sectional version of this data.
We add on to the findings of past literature by decomposing international trade 
flow to the extensive and intensive margins of international trade. The definition of 
extensive and intensive margins of international trade slightly varies by the literature. 
However, in this paper, we define extensive margin as the number of products exported 
and intensive margin as the average value of exports. Chaney (2008), Kuno et al. 
(2016),1and Lawless and Whelan (2007) adopted the above definition of extensive and 
intensive margins of international trade in their papers.2 Only a handful of past literature 
has dealt with the relationship between technical regulations and both the extensive 
1  Although Kuno et al. (2016) used the growth in the number of products exported and growth of the average 
value of exports as extensive and intensive margins of international trade, we have focused on level variables as 
done by Chaney (2008), and Lawless and Whelan (2007).
2  Chaney (2008) and Melitz (2003) assumed that each firm produces only one differentiated product when 
constructing their models based on firm activity, whereas this research empirically conducts product-level 
analysis using the extensive and intensive margins of international trade. 
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and intensive margins of international trade. Kuno et al. (2016) empirically found that 
fixed costs hamper both margins of international trade. Bao and Chen (2013) showed 
that TBT led to product diversification of traded goods and thereby enhanced trade. 
On the other hand, Shepherd (2015) showed that harmonization of standards leads to 
product diversification, which is the opposite of the theory proposed by Bao and Chen 
(2013). As the mixed results indicate, the quantification of technical regulations and 
missing NTMs data often result in unstable consequences. Therefore, in our paper, 
we have employed a novel approach of constructing additional regulatory burden for 
exporters with newly published NTMs panel data, to examine the impact of NTMs on 
the margins of international trade. 
We found that additional technical regulations show mixed results in various sectors. 
Additional regulations related to SPS negatively affect total trade via intensive margin 
with statistical significance. The result, however, showed no statistically significant 
relationship in the machinery and agriculture sectors. Additional TBT-related regulations 
negatively affect the total extensive margin, but positively affect the extensive margin of 
machinery sector with statistical significance. As machinery goods are relatively more 
convenient to diversify than agriculture goods, new firms with enough productivity will 
manage to meet additional regulations as part of their fixed costs. Our results indicate 
that additional regulations affect currently traded goods more, as new exporters will 
find a way to circumvent the regulations and enter the foreign market. Products will be 
produced in an innovate manner to meet the regulations, which means, regulations will 
facilitate product diversification. As regulations sort out low-quality goods and firms 
with low productivity, NTMs contribute to overall consumer safety and environment. 
SPS and TBT serve as effective instruments to improve market failures, as they protect 
the environment and prevent hazardous materials from entering the domestic markets. 
Therefore, we suggest that the mere elimination of NTMs is not the right solution 
for improving international trade. Rather, harmonization of NTMs in the international 
market is necessary to take advantage of the sound purposes of NTMs. 
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the sample used in this 
research. Sections 3 and 4 explain the methodology of our empirical analysis and the 




2.1. Data for technical regulations
We adopted the newly released panel NTMs researcher file from UNCTAD TRAINS3 
to construct variables for technical regulations. The data covers 92 countries/regions 
within the period of 2010-2018, wherein the raw source for ASEAN countries is ERIA, 
2019 version (Doan & Rosenow, 2019), and the source for the rest of the countries is the 
UNCTAD TRAINS database. Among the 92 countries, we excluded Occupied Palestinian 
Territory (PSE) due to the unavailability of export data and Benin (BEN), Belarus (BLR), 
and Cuba (CUB) due to the lack of Consumer Price Index (CPI) data.4 We also excluded 
the 2010-2011 period, in which only the European Union (EUN) had reported any 
observations. Thus, we constructed ACRI using the data of 88 sample countries for the 
period between 2012 to 2018, at the importer-exporter-year-product (HS six-digit)-NTMs 
classification level.5 
Among the technical measures, the research focuses on SPS and TBT, which follow the 
MAST 4 classification. Each chapter of the technical measure comprises three levels - one-
digit alphabet followed by two-digit numbers.6 According to UNCTAD (2019), chapters 
A, B, and C cover SPS measure, TBT measure, and pre-shipment inspection, respectively, 
while chapters E, F, G, H, and I are closely related to NTBs, which are explicit restrictions 
on international trade. As pre-shipment inspection consists of formalities that need to pass 
customs, we have included chapter C when constructing variables for NTMs. Chapters E 
and F are the hard measures that have been used to diminish trade by quantity and price. 
Chapters G, H, and I may negatively affect trade as they represent import payments, 
market competition fees, and investments. Moreover, we have excluded A11 and A12, as 
they are explicit prohibitions of imports and exports; A11 represents prohibitions for SPS 
reasons, and A12 covers geographical restrictions related to eligibility.
We constructed ACRI using four different samples. First, we constructed the ACRI 
with chapters A, B, and C, which depict the mixed effect of technical measures and 
3  The database is developed by UNCTAD, regional think tanks and universities. It is publicly available from 
trains.unctad.org.
4  See Appendix A for the total sample countries.
5  NTMs classification follows the 2019 version of three-digit Multi-Agency Support Team (MAST 4 or M4) 
classification. See UNCTAD (2019) for more details.
6  See Appendix B for the detailed groupings of NTMs. 
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pre-shipment inspection. Then, we incorporated chapters A and B to construct the ACRI 
which captures the mixed effect of SPS and TBT. Lastly, we constructed ACRI with each 
of the chapters A and B to show the individual effect of SPS and TBT, which focus on 
different groups of products; SPS mostly focuses on agricultural products, whereas TBT 
usually focuses on machinery goods. 
We concorded product classification using the HS 2002 (H2) classification of United 
Nations Trade Statistics correspondence tables to consistently conduct empirical 
regression.7 As the newer version of HS classification often lacks export and import data 
for developing countries, we used the H2 version of product classification. We then used 
the trade share of each HS two-digit level sector of the 88 sample countries to aggregate 
sector-level ACRI. We disaggregated our sample by manufacturing, machinery, and 
agriculture sectors to examine whether technical regulations have different impacts 
in each sector; manufacturing sector as HS chapters 28 to 92, machinery sector as HS 
chapters 84 to 92, and agricultural sector as HS chapters 1 to 24.
2.2. Data for trade values
We extracted H2 versions of HS six-digit product-level bilateral import data in US dollars 
from the United Nations International Trade Statistics Database (UN COMTRADE) and 
complemented the missing values with export mirror data. We adjusted for the mirror 
data by multiplying 1.1, which is the ratio between the cost of insurance and freight (c.i.f) 
and free on board (f.o.b), following Johansen and Panagakos (1988). We used export 
mirror data only when the whole sector (HS two-digit) was missing import statistics.8 
2.3. Other data
The current research employs distance and tariff rates as trade costs. We retrieved the 
bilateral distance between capital cities from Research and Expertise on the World 
Economy (CEPII). We used the lowest bilateral tariff rates between Most Favored 
Nations (MFN) and preferential tariff rates, with the rational assumption that exporters 
will use the lowest tariff rates when entering the foreign market. We extracted tariff data 
from the World Bank World Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS) and replaced missing 
7  See UNSTATS (2014) for more details.




values if any, with the Ad Valorem Equivalent (AVE) of each tariff. If tariff rates were 
missing between two reported years, we filled the missing value with the average value to 
prevent an abrupt increase in the time frames. Furthermore, we aggregated product-level 
(HS six-digit) tariff rates to HS two-digit tariff rates using simple means to facilitate the 
conduction of sector-level analysis. 
Price, income and wage data were all taken from the World Development Indicators 
(WDI). We used CPI for the price, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of the 
importer as income, and GDP per capita of the exporter as wage. As these variables 
report value with importer-exporter-year classification, the coefficient for these 
variables may not precisely capture the impact of price, income, and wage on the trade 
values due to lack of product-level or sector-level information.9 
3. Methodology
3.1. Measurement of technical regulations
In this section, we constructed the ACRI to capture the additional requirements that 
exporters need to meet before entering the foreign market. The number of technical 
regulations imposed by importers alone will not be accurate as it will not include 
the technical regulations that exporting countries are already following. Unlike non-
technical regulations often referred to as trade barriers, technical regulations follow 
internationally harmonized classification (MAST 4) and require mutual recognition 
between partner countries. Therefore, we captured the additional requirements that 
exporters need to follow before participating in the foreign market by following and 
modifying the regulatory distance suggested by Nabeshima and Obashi (2019). 
We began by defining a regulatory vector  implemented by exporting country  
(origin country) on product  at time  as:
  (1)
where          refers to the number of 3-digit technical measures within , which is a 
measure type grouping, as shown in Appendix B.10 We assumed that, when an exporting 
country  imposes identical technical measures to all countries without discrimination, 
9  We leave these shortcomings for future research.
10  The maximum number of  equals 17. See Appendix B for more details.
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exporting firms need to necessarily comply with the regulations for both domestic and 
foreign production and sales. 
Next, we constructed a bilateral regulatory vector in the destination market imposed 
by the importing country , against product  of the exporting country  in time  as: 
  (2)
where  refers to the technical measures within . Using the vectors representing 
the technical measures in the origin country ( ) and destination market ( ), we calculated 
the additional requirement that country  needs to comply with in order to participate in 
country  ’s market. We first constructed the aggregate number of technical regulations as:
  (3)
which implies that exporters are also imposing technical regulations on foreign 
goods, and they too need to follow both domestic and foreign regulations. We then 
applied the cosine similarity between vectors  and  to determine the degree of 
effectual regulations. The cosine similarity is, therefore, 
  (4)
where  implies identical (0 degrees) or orthogonal (90 degrees) relationship 
between the vectors. The lower the value of “Cos” ( ) , the lesser the two 
vectors         and           will be related to each other and vice versa. 
Using the cosine similarity, we define ACRI as: 
 “ACRI” =1-“Cos” ( ) .  (5)
Similar to the result of cosine similarity, ACRI always holds ACRI    [0,1), 
as both exporting and importing countries have at least some technical regulations. 
ACRI  = 0 implies that there is no additional requirement of technical regulations. 
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For exceptional cases, when only the destination market imposes any technical 
regulations, meaning that  ≠ 0 and  = 0, we replaced ACRI  = 1. For the 
opposite situation, we replaced ACRI  = 0, as there is no additional compliance 
requirement for exporting firms. When both vectors are 0, we replaced ACRI  = 0, 
as we cannot calculate ACRI. However, we dropped values with  ACRI  = 0 when 
the dataset did not report any observations. Lastly, we constructed a weighted average 
of  ACRI  using trade share as:
  (6)
where  refers to HS two-digit level sectors, and  refers to trade value. 
3.2. Extensive and intensive margins of international trade and estimating 
equations
We defined extensive and intensive margin as the number of goods exported and the 
average exports per goods, following the framework of Chaney (2008) and Lawless 
and Whelan (2007). As we defined the extensive margin and intensive margin of 
international trade at HS two-digit level sectors, we relinquished the assumption that 
each firm would produce only one differentiated product as Chaney (2008) and Melitz 
(2003) had assumed, and rather focused on product-level empirical analysis. The total 
trade value from exporting country  to importing country  in sector  at time  is 
described as: 
  (7)
where       ,       ,         ,       , and          are sector-level fixed costs, variable costs, 
price level, income, and wage, respectively.  and  are time-invariant and time-
variant error terms. We further decomposed ,  and  as:
  (8)
  (9)
【ORIS若手国際シンポジウム精選論文】Technical Regulations and Margins of International Trade:
An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Additional Compliance Requirements Indicator（Kunhyui Kim）
33
  (10)
where  refers to the number of goods exported from country  to country  in 
sector  at time , whereas        refers to the average exports per goods in sector , 
exported from  to  at time .  and  refer to the error term of each sector-level fixed 
costs and variable costs. We defined  and        as extensive margin and intensive 
margin of international trade, respectively. We postulated NTMs variable ( ) 
to be a part of fixed costs, as shown in equation (9). Finally, we modified the findings 
of Helpman et al. (2008) to decompose variable trade costs as a function of tariff rates 
( ) and distance ( ). 
We employed the Pseudo Poisson Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator to 
determine equation (7) empirically. As Silva and Tenreyro (2006) discussed using 
Monte Carlo simulations, OLS estimation often results in heteroskedasticity bias. Our 




where  refers to the natural logarithm of sector-level ACRI +1 and  
is the natural logarithm of sector-level tariff rates + 1.  refers to the natural logarithm 
of consumer price index in the importing country which represents the price level. 
 and  are the natural logarithms of GDP per capita of importers and 
exporters, which represent income and wage respectively. We conducted equations (11), 
(12), and (13) using total sectors, manufacturing sectors, machinery sectors, and agricultural 
sectors.11 We controlled for importer, exporter, sector, and year for all regressions; fixed effect. 
We further conducted robustness checks by adjusting for big jumps in NTMs data. 
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama show a sudden increase or 
decrease in the number of products due to the imposition of NTMs from 2015 to 2016. 
11  See Appendix C for summary statistics of the data.
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Also, Venezuela shows an abrupt increase in the number of products due to NTMs 
imposition in 2017. Therefore, to ensure consistency, we dropped the observations 
related to Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama from 2012 to 
2015 and the observations related to Venezuela for 2017, for robustness check. 
4.  Results
Our baseline estimation result for equation (11), which is the technical regulations on 
total trade value, is summarized in Table 1. Columns (1) to (4) provide the baseline 
Pooled OLS results using four different ACRI variables. Columns (5) to (8) indicate 
PPML results. Letters within the parenthesis beside Log of ACRI indicate the chapters of 
technical regulations. For example, Log of ACRI (ABC) indicates the natural logarithm 
of ACRI constructed using chapters A, B, and C of NTMs classification, where chapters 
A, B, and C refer to SPS, TBT, and pre-shipment inspection, respectively. 
Table 1  Baseline Results: Total Trade Value (Total Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
POLS PPML
VARIABLES Log of Trade Value Trade Value
Log of ACRI (ABC) -0.276***(0.027)
-0.028
(0.067)
Log of ACRI (AB) -0.291***(0.027)
-0.013
(0.067)
Log of ACRI (A) -0.371***(0.035)
-0.342***
(0.125)
Log of ACRI (B) -0.209***(0.029)
0.020
(0.068)


























































































FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 562,413 562,413 562,413 562,413 562,413 562,413 562,413 562,413
R-squared 0.478 0.478 0.478 0.478 0.454 0.454 0.455 0.454
*FE refers to importer, exporter, sector (HS two-digit level), and year fixed effect
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
All four ACRI variables show negative and significant coefficients on the total 
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trade value for POLS results. However, the PPML result only shows the negative and 
statistically significant result for ACRI composed of chapter A. Log of ACRI (ABC), 
Log of ACRI (AB), Log of ACRI (A), and Log of ACRI (B), represent the natural 
logarithm of ACRI constructed by the chapters within the parenthesis, respectively. 
Here, the estimated results for the ACRI variables indicate that additional regulations 
on SPS measure can disturb the total traded value. In contrast, the impact of additional 
regulations on TBT measures has weak or no relationship with the total traded value. 
Thus, the PPML results show that SPS has considerably more impact on the total trade 
value, presumably on the agriculture sector. 
Tariff rates and distance show the expected results. They hamper not only total 
international trade flow but also extensive and intensive margins of international trade 
regardless of the samples, as shown by our regression results throughout the section. 
Further control variables in the PPML estimation, including the price level of the 
importing market and income show positive and statistically significant coefficients, 
whereas wage shows positive but statistically insignificant results. 
Table 2  PPML on Extensive and Intensive Margin (Total Sample)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Extensive Margin Intensive Margin
Log of ACRI (ABC) -0.045***(0.011)
-0.094
(0.084)
Log of ACRI (AB) -0.042***(0.011)
-0.066
(0.084)
Log of ACRI (A) -0.025(0.018)
-0.413***
(0.117)
Log of ACRI (B) -0.030***(0.011)
-0.016
(0.086)


























































































FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 562,413 562,413 562,413 562,413 562,413 562,413 562,413 562,413
R-squared 0.746 0.746 0.746 0.746 0.282 0.282 0.286 0.283
*FE refers to importer, exporter, sector (HS two-digit level), and year fixed effect
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 2 summarizes the result for equations (12) and (13) for the total sample. All 
four ACRI variables show negative relationships with both the margins of international 
trade. The results indicate that ACRI composed of only SPS-related regulations shows 
a statistically insignificant result for extensive margin, whereas additional regulations 
of TBT, which is chapter B for NTMs classification, unfavorably affect the number 
of exported goods with statistically significant coefficients. However, the impact of 
TBT-related ACRI on the extensive margin is marginal towards the total trade value, 
as shown in Table 1. SPS-related ACRI, on the other hand, is the only statistically 
significant variable for the intensive margin among the four ACRI variables. As shown 
in Table 1, SPS-related ACRI is the only significant variable that negatively affects 
the total trade value through the intensive margin of international trade. That is, the 
intensive margin of international trade, which is the average exported incumbent goods 
by products, largely affects the total trade volume when compared to the extensive 
margin of international trade. We have further decomposed our analysis for each sector, 
in the coming paragraphs.
Table 3  PPML on Extensive and Intensive Margin (Manufacturing Sector)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Extensive Margin Intensive Margin
Log of ACRI (ABC) 0.003(0.013)
-0.001
(0.083)
Log of ACRI (AB) 0.008(0.013)
0.015
(0.086)
Log of ACRI (A) -0.038(0.026)
0.470**
(0.184)
Log of ACRI (B) 0.025*(0.013)
0.034
(0.087)


























































































FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 391,991 391,991 391,991 391,991 391,991 391,991 391,991 391,991
R-squared 0.746 0.746 0.746 0.746 0.211 0.210 0.210 0.210
*FE refers to importer, exporter, sector (HS two-digit level), and year fixed effect
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 4  PPML on Extensive and Intensive Margin (Machinery Sector)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Extensive Margin Intensive Margin
Log of ACRI (ABC) 0.082***(0.025)
-0.001
(0.153)
Log of ACRI (AB) 0.084***(0.026)
-0.020
(0.153)
Log of ACRI (A) 0.007 (0.047)
-0.116
(0.469)
Log of ACRI (B) 0.081***(0.025)
-0.017
(0.153)


























































































FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 64,833 64,833 64,833 64,833 64,833 64,833 64,833 64,833
R-squared 0.777 0.777 0.777 0.777 0.330 0.330 0.330 0.330 
*FE refers to importer, exporter, sector (HS two-digit level), and year fixed effect
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Tables 3 and 4 show the PPML results of the manufacturing, machinery, and 
agriculture sectors, respectively. As shown in Table 3, the manufacturing sector 
produced insignificant and inconsistent results. As the manufacturing sector comprises 
most of the HS two-digit group (28 to 92), we narrowed down the sample to the 
machinery sector (84 to 92). Table 4 shows the PPML results for machinery products. 
The estimated coefficient of ACRI indicates that ACRI positively affects the extensive 
margin of international trade. Amongst them all, TBT-related ACRI variables show 
positive and statistically significant coefficients. On the other hand, none of the ACRI 
variables show statistically significant results on the intensive margin of international 
trade, although they all showed negative coefficients. Machinery goods are, as 
predicted, affected more by TBT than SPS. The results indicate that additional TBT-
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related regulations imposed by importing countries boost the product diversification 
of exporters in the machinery sector. TBT-related regulations may relate to import 
authorization, licensing requirements, restriction on the usage of specific substances, 
and the regulations on production processes. The costs for complying with such 
regulations may be marginal for exporters that already have trade relationships with 
the foreign market (the intensive margin of international trade). Even those firms that 
are critically affected by the additional regulations can enter the foreign market again 
with slightly modified new goods (the extensive margin of international trade). This is 
because, machinery goods are relatively easier to diversify or produce than agriculture 
goods. The current fragmented global value chains (GVCs) promote and encourage 
the fragmentation of products for greater benefits of the global economy. As countries 
involved in the GVC framework impose technical regulations to ensure consumer 
health, these technical regulations become the threshold for exporting. In other words, 
as long as exporters meet the minimum threshold requirements of production networks, 
technical regulations will not act as a hidden barrier anymore. Rather, they will cause an 
improvement in the quality of imported goods as new products that meet the regulations 
will start entering the market. If the costs for complying with the TBT regulations 
are marginal, either new exporters or incumbent exporters with new goods will enter 
the market with future incentives to gain benefits in the foreign market. Therefore, 
additional TBT-related technical regulations will not only affect the currently traded 
machinery goods but also the potential entrants. Current exporters may stay in the 
market by diversifying their export goods as additional fixed costs are marginal. On the 
other hand, new exporters may try to use product innovation to circumvent regulations. 
Thus, additional regulations will contribute to product diversification of machinery 
goods.
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Table 5  PPML on Extensive and Intensive Margin (Agriculture Sector)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Extensive Margin Intensive Margin
Log of ACRI (ABC) -0.042***(0.010)
-0.078
(0.085)
Log of ACRI (AB) -0.042***(0.010)
-0.108
(0.086)
Log of ACRI (A) -0.040***(0.010)
-0.065
(0.081)
Log of ACRI (B) -0.083***(0.012)
0.076 
(0.109)



























































































FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 122,107 122,107 122,107 122,107 122,107 122,107 122,107 122,107
R-squared 0.644 0.644 0.644 0.644 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 
*FE refers to importer, exporter, sector (HS two-digit level), and year fixed effect
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
Table 5 shows that all ACRI variables negatively affect both extensive and intensive 
margins of international trade in the agriculture sector, but only statistically significant 
coefficients affect the extensive margin of international trade. Our study confirmed 
that when the compliance costs of the NTMs for agricultural goods increase, exporters 
would rather exit the market than re-enter with different goods. As Melitz (2003) 
reasons, low productive firms will exit the foreign market as it has become costly and 
so there is no longer much incentive to stay. The same applies to new exporters that 
need to comply with the new regulations. They will look for a different market with 
relatively lower fixed costs, which may cause a trade-diversion effect. 
On the other hand, the magnitude of NTMs hardly affects the exporters that already 
have trade relationships with the importing market (the intensive margin of international 
trade), similar to the machinery sector. As low productive firms drop out of the market, 
if incumbent firms comply with the new technical regulations, they can get a higher 
share in the market. If the benefits that these firms reap are greater than the additional 
costs stemming from technical regulations, they will be motivated to stay in the market. 
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Table 1 shows that TBT-related ACRI variables have no statistically significant 
results. As they show positive coefficients in the machinery sector and negative 
coefficients in the agricultural sector, we infer that the effect of additional TBT offset 
each other in the two sectors. On the other hand, SPS negatively affects the extensive 
margin of international trade in the agriculture sector and the total sector of intensive 
margin of international trade. Although SPS rarely affects the intensive margin of 
international trade for separate sectors, SPS-related technical regulations met through 
the diversification of agricultural goods and the introduction of incumbent goods for 
the total sample, critically affecting the total international trade flow. 
We controlled sudden jumps in the NTMs database to check the robustness of our 
results. Table 6 confirms that the results are nearly identical between the two samples.
Table 6  Robustness Check: PPML on Extensive and Intensive Margin (Big Jump)
Extensive Margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Machinery Sector Agriculture Sector
Log of ACRI (ABC) 0.011 (0.023)
-0.057***
(0.009)
Log of ACRI (AB) 0.085***(0.026)
-0.040***
(0.010)
Log of ACRI (A) 0.007 (0.047)
-0.038***
(0.010)
Log of ACRI (B) 0.081***(0.025)
-0.083***
(0.012)
FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 64,833 64,833 64,833 64,833 122,107 122,107 122,107 122,107
R-squared 0.777 0.777 0.777 0.777 0.644 0.644 0.644 0.644 
Intensive Margin
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES Machinery Sector Agriculture Sector
Log of ACRI (ABC) -0.057(0.126)
-0.047
(0.080)
Log of ACRI (AB) -0.020(0.153)
-0.108
(0.086)
Log of ACRI (A) -0.116(0.469)
-0.063
(0.081)
Log of ACRI (B) -0.017(0.153)
0.074 
(0.109)
FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 64,833 64,833 64,833 64,833 122,107 122,107 122,107 122,107
R-squared 0.330 0.330 0.330 0.330 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.116 
*FE refers to importer, exporter, sector (HS two-digit level), and year fixed effect
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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5. Conclusion and policy implication
This paper examines the impact of technical regulations, namely NTMs, on extensive 
and intensive margins of international trade. Specifically, we focused on how additional 
regulations imposed by importing countries affect the behavior of exporters. We used 
the ACRI indicator to calculate the additional regulations that exporters need to comply 
with before participating in the foreign market, using newly released UNCTAD-
TRAINS NTMs data. We used product-level bilateral trade value to construct both 
margins of international trade. We defined extensive and intensive margin as the number 
of products traded and the average value of trade value among HS two-digit sectors. 
Although the results showed mixed effects of additional regulations on international 
trade, our primary finding is that additional SPS-related technical regulations hamper 
total international trade flow via the total intensive margin of international trade and the 
extensive margin of agricultural goods. 
Moreover, additional regulations largely influence the extensive margin of 
international trade by sector: positively on the machinery sector and negatively on 
the agriculture sector. The effect is massive on agricultural and machinery goods, and 
marginal on total trade, implying that the effect in agriculture and machinery sectors 
offset each other. In the machinery sector, additional regulations of TBT-related NTMs 
result in the introduction of new products as machinery goods are relatively easier 
to diversify than agricultural goods. These results indicate that additional regulations 
affect not only currently traded machinery goods but also potential exporters. New 
exporters would find a way to circumvent or comply with regulations through product 
innovation. Thus, additional regulations contribute to product diversification of 
machinery goods.
The limitations of this research are as follows. First, UNCTAD-TRAINS NTMs 
data possess SPS and TBT measures on both the machinery and agriculture sector. 
SPS usually affects environmental or agricultural goods, whereas TBT usually affects 
machinery or manufacturing goods. Therefore, further explanations of the observations 
on the imposition of SPS on machinery goods and TBT on agricultural goods are 
necessary. Second, due to missing observation reports of NTMs data, the extensive 
margin of the machinery sector is larger than that of the agriculture sector. As traditional 
products usually form a larger portion of final goods, agriculture goods often show more 
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HS six-digit products than machinery or manufacturing goods. As this research treats 
missing NTMs observation as not reported rather than no regulations, our sample may 
have dropped a large portion of product-level observations on exporter-importer-year-
sector level groupings. Lastly, the ACRI still has limitations in capturing the magnitude 
of the technical regulations. Although the ACRI examines the additional burden on 
exporters who wish to participate in the foreign market, information on comparable 
ranking is still ambiguous. For example, when only the importing countries impose 
technical regulations, regardless of the number of NTMs imposed by the importers, the 
ACRI result will be one. Also, when there are no technical regulations imposed by the 
importing countries, regardless of the technical regulations imposed by the exporters, 
the ACRI result will be zero. We leave the limitation of data availability on NTMs and 
revision of the calibration of bilateral regulatory burden for future research.
We need to be extra cautious when dealing with technical regulations. Additional 
regulations may increase consumer utility by diversifying the selection of goods, as 
explained by the Love of Variety explained by Krugman (1980). Moreover, NTMs 
contribute to the environment and consumer safety by protecting the environment 
and preventing hazardous materials from penetrating the domestic markets. As our 
results suggest, additional technical regulations also contribute to the diversification of 
machinery goods. Mere eradication is not the solution for fortifying the environment of 
international trade. Therefore, governments need to ensure international harmonization 
of technical regulations to reduce the trade-distorting effect of NTMs. 
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Appendix
Appendix A. NTMs data availability 
ISO3 Reporter 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
AFG Afghanistan O X X X X X X
ARE United Arab Emirates X X X O X X X
ARG Argentina O O O O O O O
ATG Antigua and Barbuda X X X X O X X
AUS Australia X X X O O X X
BFA Burkina Faso O X X X X X X
BGD Bangladesh X X X X X O X
BHR Bahrain X X X O X X X
BHS Bahamas X X X O X X X
BOL Bolivia O O O O O O O
BRA Brazil O O O O O O O
BRB Barbados X X X O X X X
BRN Brunei Darussalam X X X O X X O
BWA Botswana X X X X X O X
CAN Canada X X X O X O X
CHE Switzerland X X X O X X X
CHL Chile O O O O O O O
CHN China X X X X O X X
CIV Cote d’Ivoire O X X X X X X
CMR Cameroon X X X O X X X
COL Colombia O O O O O O O
CPV Cape Verde X X O X X X X
CRI Costa Rica O O O O O O O
DMA Dominica X X X O X X X
DZA Algeria X X X X O X X
ECU Ecuador O O O O O O O
ETH Ethiopia X X X O X X X
EUN European Union O O O O O X O
GHA Ghana X X O X X X X
GIN Guinea O X X X X X X
GMB Gambia X O X X X X X
GRD Grenada X X X O X X X
GTM Guatemala O O O O O O O
GUY Guyana X X X O X X X
HKG Hong Kong X X X X O X X
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HND Honduras O O O O O O O
IDN Indonesia X X X O X X O
IND India X X X X X O X
ISR Israel X X X X O X X
JAM Jamaica X X X O X X X
JOR Jordan X X X X O X X
JPN Japan X X X O O X X
KAZ Kazakhstan X X X X X O X
KGZ Kyrgyzstan X X X X X O X
KHM Cambodia X X X O X X O
KOR Korea, Republic of X X X X O X X
KWT Kuwait X X X O X X X
LAO Lao PDR X X X O X X O
LBN Lebanon X X X X O X X
LBR Liberia X X O X X X X
LKA Sri Lanka X X X X O X X
MAR Morocco X X X X O X X
MEX Mexico O O O O O O O
MLI Mali X X O X X X X
MMR Myanmar X X X O X X O
MRT Mauritania X X X O X X X
MUS Mauritius X X X X X O X
MYS Malaysia X X X O X X O
NER Niger X X O X X X X
NGA Nigeria X O X X X X X
NIC Nicaragua X X O O O O O
NPL Nepal O X X X X X X
NZL New Zealand X X X O O X X
OMN Oman X X X O X X X
PAK Pakistan X X X X O X X
PAN Panama O O O O O O O
PER Peru O O O O O O O
PHL Philippines X X X O X X O
PNG Papua New Guinea X X X X O X X
PRY Paraguay O O O O O O O
QAT Qatar X X X X O X X
RUS Russian Federation X X X X O X X
SAU Saudi Arabia X X X X O X X
SEN Senegal O X X X X X X
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SGP Singapore X X X O X X O
SLV El Salvador O O O O O O O
SUR Suriname X X X O X X X
TGO Togo X X O X X X X
THA Thailand X X X O X X O
TJK Tajikistan X X X O X X O
TTO Trinidad and Tobago X X X O X X X
TUN Tunisia X X X X O X X
TUR Turkey X X X X O X X
URY Uruguay O O O O O O O
USA United States X X O X X O O
VEN Venezuela O O O O O X O
VNM Viet Nam O O O O O O O
ZWE Zimbabwe X X X X X O X
Source: Author’s calculation.
Note: See United Nations International Trade Statistics Country Code for ISO3 codes. 
Accessible: https://unstats.un.org/unsd/tradekb/knowledgebase/country-code 
Appendix B. NTMs groupings
NTMs Group NTMs within Group
A1 A13, A14, A15, A19
A2 A20, A21, A22
A3 A30, A31, A32, A33
A4 A41, A42, A49
A5 A51, A52, A53, A59
A6 A61, A62, A63, A64, A69
A8 A81, A82, A83, A84, A85, A86, A89
A9 A9
B1 B14, B15, B19
B2 B20, B21, B22
B3 B30, B31, B32, B33
B4 B41, B42, B49
B6 B6
B7 B7
B8 B81, B82, B83, B84, B85, B89
B9 B9
C C1 C2 C3 C4 C9
Note: NTMs classification follows UNCTAD (2019). The maximum possible number of measures 
within groups is the total number of NTMs within the group.  
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
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Appendix C. Summary Statistics
Total Sample
VARIABLES









Trade value 562,413 5.977e+07 1.153e+09 0.00299 2.044e+11
Extensive Margin 562,413 13.02 29.52 1 496
Intensive Margin 562,413 2.336e+06 3.900e+07 0.00299 8.746e+09
ACRI – ABC 562,413 0.361 0.414 0 1
ACRI – AB 562,413 0.348 0.411 0 1
ACRI – A 562,413 0.177 0.335 0 1
ACRI – B 562,413 0.321 0.405 0 1
Tariff 562,413 7.083 8.998 1 336.4
Distance 562,413 8,460 5,461 111.1 19,812
CPI 562,413 124.3 22.28 92.46 348.2
GDPPC ( j ) 562,413 85,426 247,317 384.9 1.014e+06
GDPPC ( i ) 562,413 47,482 165,416 367.6 1.014e+06
Manufacturing Sector
VARIABLES









Trade value 391,991 6.411e+07 1.140e+09 0.00299 1.391e+11
Extensive Margin 391,991 15.91 34.51 1 496
Intensive Margin 391,991 1.394e+06 1.798e+07 0.00299 2.467e+09
ACRI – ABC 391,991 0.320 0.397 0 1
ACRI – AB 391,991 0.304 0.392 0 1
ACRI – A 391,991 0.0924 0.235 0 1
ACRI – B 391,991 0.286 0.389 0 1
Tariff 391,991 6.525 6.836 1 54.72
Distance 391,991 8,615 5,493 111.1 19,812
CPI 391,991 124.5 22.41 92.46 348.2
GDPPC ( j ) 391,991 81,313 241,302 384.9 1.014e+06
GDPPC ( i ) 391,991 46,361 161,991 367.6 1.014e+06
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Trade value 64,833 2.161e+08 2.615e+09 0.0698 1.391e+11
Extensive Margin 64,833 32.80 66.98 1 496
Intensive Margin 64,833 2.549e+06 3.107e+07 0.0598 2.467e+09
ACRI – ABC 64,833 0.331 0.384 0 1
ACRI – AB 64,833 0.319 0.380 0 1
ACRI – A 64,833 0.0644 0.209 0 1.000
ACRI – B 64,833 0.311 0.381 0 1
Tariff 64,833 5.182 5.292 1 45.58
Distance 64,833 8,785 5,431 111.1 19,812
CPI 64,833 124.5 22.23 92.46 348.2
GDPPC ( j ) 64,833 76,405 233,040 384.9 1.014e+06
GDPPC ( i ) 64,833 41,937 150,773 367.6 1.014e+06
Agriculture Sector
VARIABLES









Trade value 122,107 2.102e+07 1.653e+08 0.00299 1.325e+10
Extensive Margin 122,107 5.546 7.425 1 91
Intensive Margin 122,107 2.046e+06 1.445e+07 0.00299 2.209e+09
ACRI – ABC 122,107 0.515 0.446 0 1
ACRI – AB 122,107 0.511 0.447 0 1
ACRI – A 122,107 0.488 0.449 0 1
ACRI – B 122,107 0.449 0.444 0 1
Tariff 122,107 8.923 14.00 1 336.4
Distance 122,107 7,970 5,348 111.1 19,812
CPI 122,107 123.7 21.89 92.46 348.2
GDPPC ( j ) 122,107 97,895 264,372 384.9 1.014e+06
GDPPC ( i ) 122,107 51,399 176,978 367.6 1.014e+06
Note: Variables in the summary statistics are raw value before the transformation. 
CPI refers to Consumer Price Index, and GDPPC indicates GDP per capita. 
Source: Author’s calculation.

